'They sent us to Lima': How Ukraine's secret GPS weapon around Kyiv tricks Russian drones and Kinzhal missiles into thinking they're 7,628 miles away in Peru
I think from a technical perspective it’s less suspicious to trick the drone to think it is in Peru, compared to making it think it’s 10km off course.
The way positioning systems work is they look at time signals from multiple satellites. By looking at when the signals arrive and the time encoded in the signal. If you can mess with the arrival time of the signal through jamming, to move it 10km, you need to mess with the signal of just one satellite and not the others. Then if the computer has extra signals to work with, it can detect and ignore the bad signal. That’s a very basic math operation that can be done by a very basic computer. 1960s level stuff.
But if you can delay the time signal on all the sources by the same amount, the computer is non the wiser, because they are all corroborating each other. The effect is it places it on the opposite side of the globe. In order to prevent this form of spoofing, you need a higher level computer to interpret what the guidance computer is telling it. It needs memory to track where it is reported to be and where it is expected to be. It likely also needs additional optical or radar sensors to fall back on.
Detecting that the signal is false when it’s reporting the missile or drone is in Peru is a simple as noticing the coordinates are outside the expected operational area, so little more than two range checks, one for latitude, one for longitude. Determining that the signal is only a little off is much harder without also running inertial navigation to compare it against, and even then you have the issue of which to trust.
GPS receivers have the ephemeris data of all the GPS satellites, so just delaying all of the signals again wouldn’t work, as the receiver would know those particular satellites aren’t above the horizon in Peru. I suspect that the way to spoof the signal location is to jam the normal signals (which are pretty low powered by the time they get to to receiver) and transmit faked signals for all satellites that the receiver is expecting. Doing that would let you feed it a more believable error.
Those satellites orbit the earth, so depending on how and how much you spoof the time signal, it may make complete sense according to the GPS signals for those satellites to be over Peru.
Remember these military guidance kits are exceptionally basic, so as to be more reliable and less sensitive to basic forms of jamming. Which is why spoofing them becomes highly situational.
Civilian GPS equipment is infinitely more sophisticated and has a lot more processing power available to it. Because it does not need to deal with an electronic warfare environment.
I think from a technical perspective it’s less suspicious to trick the drone to think it is in Peru, compared to making it think it’s 10km off course.
The way positioning systems work is they look at time signals from multiple satellites. By looking at when the signals arrive and the time encoded in the signal. If you can mess with the arrival time of the signal through jamming, to move it 10km, you need to mess with the signal of just one satellite and not the others. Then if the computer has extra signals to work with, it can detect and ignore the bad signal. That’s a very basic math operation that can be done by a very basic computer. 1960s level stuff.
But if you can delay the time signal on all the sources by the same amount, the computer is non the wiser, because they are all corroborating each other. The effect is it places it on the opposite side of the globe. In order to prevent this form of spoofing, you need a higher level computer to interpret what the guidance computer is telling it. It needs memory to track where it is reported to be and where it is expected to be. It likely also needs additional optical or radar sensors to fall back on.
This drives up cost and complexity.
Detecting that the signal is false when it’s reporting the missile or drone is in Peru is a simple as noticing the coordinates are outside the expected operational area, so little more than two range checks, one for latitude, one for longitude. Determining that the signal is only a little off is much harder without also running inertial navigation to compare it against, and even then you have the issue of which to trust.
GPS receivers have the ephemeris data of all the GPS satellites, so just delaying all of the signals again wouldn’t work, as the receiver would know those particular satellites aren’t above the horizon in Peru. I suspect that the way to spoof the signal location is to jam the normal signals (which are pretty low powered by the time they get to to receiver) and transmit faked signals for all satellites that the receiver is expecting. Doing that would let you feed it a more believable error.
Those satellites orbit the earth, so depending on how and how much you spoof the time signal, it may make complete sense according to the GPS signals for those satellites to be over Peru.
Remember these military guidance kits are exceptionally basic, so as to be more reliable and less sensitive to basic forms of jamming. Which is why spoofing them becomes highly situational.
Civilian GPS equipment is infinitely more sophisticated and has a lot more processing power available to it. Because it does not need to deal with an electronic warfare environment.