'They sent us to Lima': How Ukraine's secret GPS weapon around Kyiv tricks Russian drones and Kinzhal missiles into thinking they're 7,628 miles away in Peru
My guess is that military systems can detect potential spoofing, even quite subtle, and abandon GPS for inertial guidance. If you’re subtle enough for it not to notice, it won’t throw it off far enough to be useful. This is still a win however, since that will hit accuracy hard still.
I also suspect that cutting past valid, but incorrect signals is harder than the equivalent amount of interference (white noise). This would cut down on transmitter power requirements, making it cheaper and harder to target. The wildly inaccurate data (rather than subtly) would also help avoid accidentally screwing over friendly forces also trying to use GPS.
My guess is that military systems can detect potential spoofing, even quite subtle, and abandon GPS for inertial guidance. If you’re subtle enough for it not to notice, it won’t throw it off far enough to be useful. This is still a win however, since that will hit accuracy hard still.
I also suspect that cutting past valid, but incorrect signals is harder than the equivalent amount of interference (white noise). This would cut down on transmitter power requirements, making it cheaper and harder to target. The wildly inaccurate data (rather than subtly) would also help avoid accidentally screwing over friendly forces also trying to use GPS.