- cross-posted to:
- linux@lemmy.ml
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- cross-posted to:
- linux@lemmy.ml
Ricky Mondello (@rmondello@hachyderm.io)
hachyderm.ioIf you actually read the “Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them.” post going around, you’ll find a transparent attempt to clumsily string together a conspiracy.
The post is predicated on the idea that a feature of WebAuthn called “attestation”, which is only used in high-assurance and usually corporate scenarios, and usually with physical hardware security keys, will be leveraged to hurt people, somehow.
The post posits that a website like X will bait and switch users: first, you get a passkey. Then, later, scary “attested” passkeys! This simply isn’t possible to do because attestation isn’t supported on the web for mass market, consumer authentication.
Attestation for passkeys (software-based, syncable credentials) is antithetical to their mass market goals, and would freeze out independent, non-corporate-backed credential managers. It’s an explicit non-goal of the designers of passkeys, who work together in a forum anyone can join.
And trust me, websites and apps like banks repeatedly asked for attestation at the beginning of the industry’s passkey journey. The platforms, browsers, and credential management apps have held firm that the goal of passkeys is reducing phishing and **not** some kind of trusted computing scheme. (And I will note: over my dead body!)
Besides the theory of the case being fundamentally wrong, there are several things that make the post disqualifying in terms of arguing something useful or important in the realm of security, privacy, and user authentication:
1. Intentionally presenting things that are complicated as inherently suspicious. (Delivering security by design can be complicated, yes!)
2. Describing TOTP as a “great solution” for adding security to a password-based account. When the most common threat model on the web is phishing (a word the post never mentions!), TOTP hardly buys you _anything_. TOTP is phishable.
3. Seeming to be unbothered by how many logical leaps are being taken without actually understanding the topic being discussed.
There are bad things happening in tech and untrustworthy people and companies do exist, but they’re largely in the AI space, not the “let’s stop people we love from getting compromised through phishing” space.
A rebuttal to an anti-passkey, pro-TOTP post that has made the rounds on Lemmy as well.


I’m quite confused about all the suspicion about passkeys. I just add a passkey to my password manager whenever the service offers it. I don’t understand the “lock-in” concern because I can just import + export my passwords between managers
You can, maybe, have you actually imported or exported all of your passkeys before?
The concern is that in order to solve a technical problem, trusting the user, a system of actions and technologies called remote attestation was added to the passkey design. It allows for the service being authenticated into to figure out if it even wants to accept the supposed users attempt. One way remote attestation can be done is by client. Not using a client the service accepts? No way in even if you have the right credentials!
This is really powerful technology that lets me ensure my own services won’t even allow connection to insecure clients or just clients I don’t wanna talk to.
But of course we’re not talking about me using passkeys to gate access to my own services I control, we’re talking about Google, Microsoft and Apple doing it. So built into the passkey standard is the capacity for the service to simply stop allowing you to access it with a passkey if you don’t have the right thingy (or any other suite of remote attestation technologies, client is just one example).
Do you know if your passkeys do this? Do you know how to get in to your accounts if passkeys are suddenly not working?
People are mostly afraid of lock in, control, etc here but the real problem is that most users don’t understand how passkeys work. How can you comply with a regime of passkey use if you don’t know how they work?
Interesting. I was ignorant about that. For my use case (a faster alternative to totp but I still have that in case), it’s pretty useful, but I can definitely see the concerns now.
There is no reason for you to be using a passkey if it’s in your manager already
Passkeys use public-private cryptography and password use shared secret. So regardless if the key is stored in a password manager, the passkey is still more secure. It would be impervious if stored in a security key. But it is still more secure than a password, even when handeled the same way.
Right up until you attempt to log in on an less trusted device. Password+TOTP fixes this.
passkeys are more phishing resistant than passwords, even with password managers